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Abstract 4 
Non-competitive bids have recently become a major concern in both Public and Private 5 
sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to 6 
help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these 7 
models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. 8 
The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped 9 
auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more 10 
conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new 11 
method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the 12 
solution to what has become known as the German tank problem. The model is then 13 
demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data and shown to detect cover 14 
bids with high accuracy. 15 
This work contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to 16 
detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices. 17 
 18 
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 2 
Introduction 22 
In the bidding context, collusion, or bid rigging as it is sometimes known, occurs when 23 
businesses that would otherwise be expected to be genuinely competing for work secretly 24 
conspire to raise prices or sometimes to lower the quality of goods or services for purchasers 25 
in a bid process (OECD 2009). Collusive bids can be particularly damaging in public 26 
procurement, since in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 27 
countries, for example, public procurement represents about 15% of GDP (OECD 2007), a 28 
figure even higher in other countries (Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009). Collusive practices also 29 
absorb resources from procurers and taxpayers, since this action usually undermines the 30 
advantages of a competitive market and diminishes public confidence in the competitive 31 
process (Marshall and Marx 2009; Anderson and Cau 2011). Moreover, these are illegal in 32 
many countries, involving considerable resources dedicated to prosecuting those companies 33 
involved (Bajari and Summers 2002; Hendricks et al. 2008). 34 
‘Bid-covering’ or ‘cover bidding’ is the most recurrent form of collusive arrangement in 35 
sealed bid auctions (Ishii 2008). It occurs when individuals or firms agree to submit bids 36 
where either (1) a competitor agrees to submit a bid that is higher than the bid of the 37 
designated winner; (2) a competitor submits a bid that is known to be insufficiently 38 
competitive to be accepted from the technical standpoint; or (3) a competitor submits a bid 39 
that contains special contractual terms that are known to be unacceptable to the auctioneer 40 
(OECD 2007). Cover bids are also used in the well-known collusive arrangement of ‘bid 41 
rotation’ (Porter and Zona 1993; Ishii 2009), which involves participating firms continuing to 42 
bid while taking turns to be the winning bidder. 43 
Thus, classifying bids as abnormal and combating collusion are primary concerns for 44 
auctioneers as those bidders who manage to form a viable cartel or bidding ring (i.e. a group 45 
of companies planning to restrict the amount of actual competition among the participants in 46 
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one or several auctions) can seriously affect winning bid values (Blume and Heidhues 2008; 47 
Hu et al. 2011). As a result, Klemperer (2002) and Anderson et al. (2012) regard that 48 
collusion, as well as other competition policy issues, is being more important in the design of 49 
practical auctions than the budget-constraint, affiliation and risk-aversion issues that are often 50 
addressed in the mainstream theory of auctions. 51 
The literature proposes some forms of auction rules to discourage collusion, such as 52 
establishing a reserve price that is a function of cartel size (Graham and Marshall 1987), 53 
selecting efficient auction mechanisms depending on the amount of correlation between 54 
colluders (Laffont and Martimort 2000), exploiting informational asymmetries concerning 55 
potential colluders and including a non-trivial probability of not selling the object auctioned 56 
(Che and Kim 2006, 2008), and including both effective ceiling and reserve prices 57 
(Chowdhury 2008). However, collusion schemes are always difficult to detect as they are 58 
typically negotiated in a strictly secretive way and are not usually evident from the results of 59 
a single auction, as cover bids have to give the appearance of genuinely competitive bids 60 
(Bajari and Summers 2002). An additional problem is that an effective strategy for avoiding 61 
collusion usually requires the auctioneer to be able to predict the distribution function from 62 
which bidders are assumed to draw their values and be aware of which bidders belong to 63 
which cartel (Bajari and Summers 2002), while obtaining such information is intricate, if not 64 
impossible, in practice (Hu et al. 2011). 65 
A collusive arrangement is often revealed only upon the appearance of a steady pattern of 66 
distrustful or abnormal behavior from several bidders over a period of time (OECD 2009). 67 
However, the existence of such patterns does not necessarily act as evidence of collusion, as 68 
there may simply be decreasing returns to scale of bidders’ cost functions or a change in 69 
market conditions. For example, lower marginal costs occur with firms with idle capacity 70 
(low current workload) and hence, when reflected in the bid, are relatively more likely to win 71 
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the auction (Porter and Zona 1993; Porter 2005). Despite this cautionary note, sets of tools 72 
that help identify particular bid behaviors as being collusive, or at least abnormal, can be of 73 
use to auctioneers (Rasch and Wambach 2009). 74 
In this paper, we aim at identifying abnormal bids in either public or private sealed-bid 75 
auctions, as well as in auctions in which other non-price criteria in addition to the economic 76 
bid value may be involved. These non-price criteria are increasingly common in both public 77 
sector procurement auctions (Perng et al. 2006; Tan et al. 2006; Bergman and Lundberg 78 
2013) and private sector auctions (Bajari and Summers 2002; Gayle and Richard 2008). 79 
The paper makes three major contributions: firstly, it extends a recent model developed by 80 
Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2013a) for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (where an 81 
upper bid limit is set by the auctioner) to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no 82 
such limits are set). Secondly, it presents a new method for estimating the bid distribution 83 
supports or bounds of bids by an approach associated with the solution to the German tank 84 
problem, a well-known statistical case study that shares several characteristics with bidding. 85 
Thirdly, a new metric named Pabn for highlighting abnormal bids is proposed for use in 86 
combination with the extended Ballesteros-Pérez et al.’s (2013a) model. The three 87 
components of the model are applied and evaluated to a sample of real construction bid data 88 
and shown to detect cover bids with a high level of accuracy, despite being conceived as a 89 
rough detection tool. 90 
Background 91 
A large body of economic theory demonstrates that the existence of both competitive and 92 
collusive bid strategies depends very much on the cost structure of the bidders (Curtis and 93 
Maines 1973; Maskin and Riley 2000) and rules of the auction (Porter and Zona 1993, 1999; 94 
Baldwin et al. 1997; Pesendorfer 2000). Theories of collusion in auctions also highlight the 95 
importance of pre-auction meetings among bidders, in which incentives or compensations are 96 
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generally provided by the winner to the losers. McAfee and McMillan's (1992) static scheme 97 
characterizes efficient collusion when no side transfer is possible and in which the designated 98 
winner is independent of history. Later, this analysis is extended by Aoyagi (2003) and 99 
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) to a repeated framework in which, as opposed to McAfee 100 
and McMillan’s static bid rotation (Porter and Zona 1999), bid coordination is based on past 101 
history within a dynamic bid rotation scheme. 102 
In contrast to the theoretical literature, although there has been a great deal of empirical work 103 
aimed at detecting collusion in procurement auctions (Harrington 2005; Paha 2011), little 104 
attention has been paid in the literature relating to the inner working of the bidding rings or 105 
collusive bid groups (McAfee and McMillan 1992; Hendricks et al. 2008). Related work is 106 
Porter and Zona's (1993, 1999) modelling of the probability of a bidder winning by assuming 107 
a bid function linear in observable cost factors. Subsequent work by Bajari and Ye (2001, 108 
2003) consistently observes the violation of the ‘conditional independence’ and 109 
‘exchangeability’ conditions, which must always be satisfied by a competitive bid strategy. 110 
Finally, Ballesteros-Pérez et al (2012a, 2013b, 2014) introduce a Bid Tender Forecasting 111 
Model that is partially reconfigured to detect extreme abnormal bidders in capped auctions 112 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2013a). This method, which we will term the Ballesteros‒ González‒113 
Cañavate method, is aimed at identifying bidders whose behavior is not ‘conditionally 114 
independent’ and ‘exchangeable’, that is, not following a regular or predictable pattern. In 115 
short, this approximate but quick method assumes that individual bids follow a Uniform 116 
distribution in the absence of some kind of abnormal behavior among the bidders involved. 117 
In this connection, multiple statistical distributions have been used to analyze bid patterns, 118 
the main ones of which in the context of construction contract auctions are the Uniform, 119 
Normal, Lognormal, Gamma and Weibull densities (Skitmore 2014). 120 
Therefore, in the absence of any generally agreed distribution, the Uniform distribution 121 
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continues to be used here for three reasons: firstly, several previous researchers consider it to 122 
be accurate enough to depict construction bid data; secondly, the method is intended to be 123 
sufficiently robust for the uniform distribution to generate reasonably approximate results; 124 
and, thirdly, any other statistical distribution can be re-scaled into a Uniform distribution 125 
(  1,0U ) by using its cumulative distribution probability values if necessary. 126 
However, a problem concerning finite distributions such as the Uniform density is to estimate 127 
the value of the supports (upper and lower bounds) involved, as these are different for each 128 
auction and each auction happens only once. Of the several estimators available for this, one 129 
known as the solution to the German Tank problem provides a simple yet relatively accurate 130 
method and is presented in more detail in the next section. 131 
In sum, non-competitive bids have become a major concern in both Public and Private 132 
procurement auctions and several models have been developed to help identify collusive 133 
bidders. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive 134 
information that is difficult to obtain in real-life situations. Therefore, the implementation of 135 
other simpler but less accurate models similar to the Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model 136 
should help in highlighting non-competitive bid behaviors in the large amount of auctions 137 
that are handled daily by contracting authorities all around the world. 138 
Thus, the research objectives of this paper are three-fold. Firstly, to extend the Ballesteros‒139 
González‒Cañavate capped auction model to the uncapped auction, since this is the more 140 
widespread procurement approach in many countries, USA included. Secondly, since the 141 
extension of the Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model will require working with an 142 
underlying bid distribution then, assuming that this distribution is well represented by the 143 
Uniform density, a method will also be proposed to estimate the value of the supports 144 
involved. Thirdly, a new metric named Pabn to identify abnormal bids will also be introduced. 145 
This metric will help in focusing the extended Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model to 146 
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those bids or combinations of bids with higher values of Pabn. 147 
Methodology 148 
Analysis of individual bid distributions 149 
This subsection deals with extending the Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate capped auction 150 
model for use in uncapped auctions. Therefore, here a ‘Bidder’s Bid’ (noted as iB ) will be the 151 
monetary bid made by a given bidder i  in an uncapped auction, where  iB0 . 152 
Firstly and similarly to the Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model, the method developed 153 
needs to quantify how many bidders are involved in the auction to study the bidders’ relative 154 
economic bid distances from each other (in other words, the expected average bid gap 155 
between two consecutive bids) so as to be contrasted with a standard pattern distribution. 156 
Aiming to do this, there is an extensive literature focusing on predicting the potential number 157 
of bidders in auctions (e.g. Ngai 2002; Carr 2005). However, when the Request For Proposals 158 
deadline is reached, the number of participating bidders is disclosed ex post, and then, the 159 
standard pattern distribution to which the bids will have to be compared can be defined. 160 
Likewise, assuming bids are randomly and Uniformly distributed, then the expected 161 
difference in probability and value between the ith and i+1th of the N  ranked bids in an 162 
auction is a constant. Therefore, the probability of surpassing the thn  bid ( nthP ) can be easily 163 





5.05.01       (1) 165 
where 1i  represents the most economical bid (lowest bid) and Ni   represents the most 166 
expensive bid (highest bid). Therefore, the variable nthP  also represents the bidder’s thn  167 
position performance by means of a coefficient that ranges from N21 to N211 , the 168 
distance between bid i  and bid 1i  being always the value N1  (see Y values in Figure 1).  169 
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The next step is to correlate every bid ( iB ) with its respective probability of being surpassed, 170 
nthP . Aiming to simplifying future calculations, using the same interval of variation as nthP  is 171 
again preferred, as an alternative to the range: [ minB  (lowest bid, most economical), maxB  172 
(highest bid, most expensive)], since the true bid distribution supports are not known. 173 
Therefore, the mathematical expression for re-scaling the bids from their natural range [ minB  174 
, maxB ] (in monetary-unit basis) to the range [ N21 , N211 ] (in per-unit basis), which will 175 











     (2) 177 
Note in Figure 1 that this expression assigns X-axis values ranging from N21  (if minBBi  ) 178 
to N211 (if maxBBi  ), but keeps intact the original relative distances between bids on the 179 
X-axis. That is, unlike Y-axis nthP  values, the distance between bidder i  and bidder 1i  will 180 
not usually be N1 , but proportional to the original relative distance when previously 181 
expressed in monetary bid values. 182 
<Figure 1> 183 
Therefore, beginning with a group of bids which took part in an uncapped auction and whose 184 
values have been previously ordered from lowest to highest:  iBi , , a new set of  nthi PB ,'  185 
values can be obtained by using equations 1 and 2. If these latter points fall approximately on 186 
a straight line from  NN 21,21  to  NN 211,211  , this indicates that the bids can be 187 
treated as perfectly following a Uniform distribution, and when other complementary 188 
conditions are also fulfilled, no abnormal bids should be present. 189 
Hence, after every participating bid has been ordered and converted into a Standard Bid value 190 
( iB' ) and its respective nthP  is also calculated, it is necessary to compare this set of 191 
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standardized bid values to the ‘Standard Pattern distribution (SPD)’ whose mathematical 192 
expression is just a straight line: 193 
ipattern BY '       (3) 194 
In short, equation 3 means a cumulative distribution function whose representation is a 195 
bisector line no matter the number of bids, and whose valid range of values will be from 196 
N21 to N211  in both horizontal and vertical axes. This standard line suggests than any 197 
two adjacently ranked bids will be placed ‘on average’ a N1  value from each other, both in 198 
their iB'  values and nthP  values. 199 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, perfect matching between the SPD and each group of 200 
 nthi PB ,'  points is difficult to achieve; thus, to delimit a band in which the recently calculated 201 
set of  nthi PB ,'  points can be classified as close enough to the SPD, a new couple of 202 
boundary lines, named Standard Pattern upper and lower limit lines, have to be defined. The 203 
mathematical expressions of these boundary lines are these, and it can be noted in Figure 1 204 
that they are located at a N21 distance just over and below the SPD: 205 
N
BY ilower 2
1'       (4) 206 
N
BY iupper 2
1'       (5) 207 
We then have a  nthi PB ,'  set of points that lie on a line with 1N segments and, since this 208 
composite line could be partially inside and partially outside the band defined by equations 4 209 
and 5, it is more appropriate to represent the group of  nthi PB ,'  values by its regression 210 
straight line. This way, whenever the regression line is completely within the boundaries 211 
defined by the lower and upper limit lines, it will be possible to assume that the bid 212 
distribution is actually close enough to the SPD. The band limit width N1 (from N21  to 213 
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N21 ) coincides with the distorting effect equivalent to one non-existent bidder that one or 214 
several collusive bidders may generate over the bids distribution. The upper and lower limit 215 
lines then define a band in which the iB' ’s regression line (least squares) should be squeezed 216 
in as long as the ‘exchangeability condition’ is granted. Notwithstanding, there is another 217 
condition to fulfill: the coefficient of determination, 2R , of this least squares line must be 218 
close enough to one, in order to claim that the Standard Bids set is well represented by its 219 
regression curve. Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2013a) suggest that 2R  should be above 0.90 (a 220 
0.10 distance from 1.0), but it seems to be more appropriate to set its level according to the 221 
number of bids actually analyzed (in this case, a N1  value from 1.0). Therefore, the 2R  will 222 
be required to be above   NNR 1min  , since, by fulfilling this condition, the least squares 223 
regression line should explain the equivalent percentage of variability, which means that the 224 
actual nthP  values should not be separated by more than a N1 value from the regression line 225 
Y’s values due to uncontrolled data variability. 226 
In addition, the condition of ‘conditional independence’ is also to be granted whenever bids 227 
represent genuine competition. This second condition can be broken down into two more 228 
verifications. The first is that the residuals (the difference between iB' ‘s nthP  and patternY  229 
values as in Figure 1) have to follow a normal distribution; and, hence, a Student t-test should 230 
be carried out on the residuals dataset. The second verification implies that the mean of the 231 
iB'  Standard Bids, mB' , should be nearly 0.5. 232 
This last condition, when embedded in equation 2 is equivalent to 5.0' 2/  Nnthm PB  which 233 
means that whenever there are no collusive or abnormal bids, the bid distributions are 234 
symmetrical around their mB  value, as also originally stated in Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 235 
(2013a). Hence, a new coefficient that monitors mB ' deviations has been created. This 236 
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coefficient, named distortionmB' , is able to measure the distance of mB '  from 0.5 in multiples of 237 


















distm  (6) 239 
Measuring this mB'  deviation as equation 6 proposes also has the advantage of revealing how 240 
many bidder positions the mB '  value has been dislodged in N1  multiples again, then, values 241 
lower than 1.0 are required to grant the ‘conditional independence’ condition, that is to ensure 242 
there is not a subset of bids that follow a different distribution and, quite probably, have a 243 
different mean value. 244 
To sum up, to guarantee ‘conditional independence’ as well as ‘exchangeability’, whenever a 245 
set of auction bids is analyzed, the following four mathematical conditions must be satisfied: 246 
Condition 1. The  nthi PB ,'  least squares line must be completely inside the zone bounded by 247 
the lines defined by equations 4 and 5. 248 
Condition 2. The regression straight line’s coefficient of determination must be above min2R , 249 
i.e.   NNRRactual 1min22  . 250 
Condition 3. The differences between the iB' ‘s nthP  and patternY  values (residuals) must follow 251 
a normal distribution, which means checking the following condition   iBstudentstudent tt '%5  . 252 
Condition 4. The mean Standard Bid mB'  must have been displaced less than a N1  value 253 
from 0.5, which is equivalent to 1' distortionmB . 254 
These four conditions are already included in the original Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate 255 
model, but here they have been refined with two partially reformulated conditions in order to 256 
increase their effectiveness in uncapped auctions. Therefore, any group of bidders that do not 257 
comply with any of these four conditions means that at least one bidder participated with an 258 
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abnormal bid generating an effect that adds up to N/1 . Nonetheless, in practice, the bidders 259 
should always be allowed to justify their respective economic bids (since they may possible 260 
have been unintentionally estimated incorrectly). However, when a bidder exhibits a steady 261 
abnormal behavior detected in this way, it would obviously qualify as potentially collusive 262 
and worthy of further investigation. The method could therefore be used for every auction as 263 
soon as the bids are disclosed, since it would act as a quick, but preliminary, collusion-264 
detection mechanism. 265 
Estimation of distribution supports  266 
While the previous subsection extended the original Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model 267 
for abnormal bid detection to uncapped auctions, this section refines this further by including 268 
a second research contribution in estimating the distribution supports. 269 
Estimating the values of the supports of finite bid distributions requires simple, but not 270 
obvious, reasoning that has not been previously applied to auctions to date. Assuming that 271 
bids follow a continuous uniform distribution,  baU , , it is expected that the true lower 272 
boundary, a , will always be a little below the observed minB , whereas the true upper limit, 273 
b , will always be little above the observed maxB . The distance between the observed 274 
boundary values ( minB  and maxB ) and the true values ( a  and b ) can then be calculated by 275 
using the German tank problem solution. 276 
In the statistical theory of estimation, the problem of estimating the maximum of a discrete 277 
uniform distribution from sampling without replacement is known as the German tank 278 
problem due to its application in World War II to the estimation of the number of German 279 
tanks (Goodman 1954). During the course of the war, the Western Allies made sustained 280 
efforts to determine the extent of production of German Panther tanks. To do this they made 281 
use of the gearbox serial numbers printed on captured or destroyed German tanks (Ruggles 282 
and Brodie 1947). This provided the solution to the problem that can be understood 283 
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intuitively as "The population maximum equals the sample maximum plus the average gap 284 
between observations in the sample", the gap between the ranked observations being added to 285 
compensate for the negative bias of the sample maximum as an estimator for the population 286 
maximum. 287 
Although individual bid distributions is effectively continuous instead of the discrete German 288 
Tank problem version, the same principle can be used to obtain the bounds a  and b  by 289 
translating the German tank problem into auction bids: 290 
 The maximum of a uniform distribution ( b ) equals the sample maximum ( maxB ) plus the 291 
average gap (there are 1N  gaps between maxB  and minB ) between the ranked observations 292 
in the sample, whereas 293 
 the minimum of a uniform distribution ( a ) equals the sample minimum ( minB ) minus 294 
the average gap ( 1N  again) between observations in the sample. 295 












BBBb     (8) 298 
Additionally, two major parameters allow the analysis of future auction bid distributions: the 299 
mean,   2ba , and the standard deviation,   12ab  , which can be immediately 300 
calculated by (7) and (8). 301 
However, in order to prove that the boundary estimates of a  and b  are accurate, it is 302 
necessary to check if the mean and the standard deviation really fit the actual auction bid 303 
data. In platykurtic distributions, such as the Uniform distribution, despite both the sample 304 
mean and the sample median are unbiased estimators of the midpoint, neither is as efficient as 305 
the sample mid-range, i.e. the arithmetic mean of the sample maximum and the sample 306 
 14 
minimum (which is also the maximum likelihood estimate). Therefore, on this occasion, the 307 
mean value is not useful, since by definition     22minmax baBB  . Then, if: 308 

















  309 







  (9) 311 
To date, the bid standard deviation has been a difficult parameter to predict, with higher 312 
coefficients of determination around 0.7 (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2012a, 2012b), mostly 313 
because no researcher has considered including the number of bids N  involved in this 314 
relationship, since it was counterintuitive. Therefore, if Equations 7, 8 and 9 constitute a 315 
reasonable approximation of the Uniform bounds and dispersion parameters representing the 316 
bid distribution, the coefficient of determination in the actual bid dataset proposed should be 317 
noticeably above 0.7. This issue will be addressed later in the “Method validation” section. 318 
Metric for abnormal bids 319 
Specific bids can be tested for abnormality by checking conditions 1-4 above. However, 320 
doing this comprehensively would involve N2  individual and group combinations of 321 
bidders, a figure that becomes too high as the number of bids N  increases. Hence, the third 322 
contribution of this paper is an alternative way for identifying bids that are more likely to be 323 
abnormally higher or lower than others, in addition to the lowest and highest ones. This is 324 
achieved by a simplified probabilistic analysis, unlike the original Ballesteros‒González‒325 
Cañavate method, which just checks the four conditions for the lowest and highest bids. This 326 
involves considering how likely it is that one bid could have fallen outside the supports limits 327 
[ a ,b ]. Nevertheless, since the true values of the supports are not known but estimated by (7) 328 
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and (8), it is necessary to obtain the general statistical distributions of a and b , which at the 329 
same time are expressed as a function of the variables N , maxB  and minB . 330 
The number of bidders, N , is known. However, the lowest ( minB ) and the highest ( maxB ) 331 
bids have to be expressed in terms of the first and last order statistics, respectively. In 332 
Extreme Value Theory, these order statistics follow a Beta distribution for the Uniform 333 
distribution, where (David and Nagaraja 2003): 334 
 NBBetaB i   ,1,min     (10) 335 
 1,,max   NBBetaB i     (11) 336 
Introduced both (10) and (11) into (7) and (8) results in the curves represented in Figure 2, 337 
which were obtained by simulation. 338 
<Figure 2> 339 
These curves take on values within the range     1,11, Naa   in the case of the lower 340 
support a  and within     1,0,  NNbb   in the case of the upper support b , but if they are 341 
re-scaled within the intervals    1,0, aa   and    1,0, bb  , respectively, the result is as 342 
shown in Figure 3. 343 
<Figure 3> 344 
This series of curves with the same domain, even though not corresponding to Beta 345 
distributions, are very accurately approximated by this type of curve as: 346 
 BABBetaa i   ,,      (12) 347 
 ABBBetab i   ,,      (13) 348 




A       (14) 350 
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    

  111 
B      (15) 351 
with 352 
N






N       (17) 354 
where the mean   is exact, whereas the variance   of these distributions was obtained by 355 
the simulation and always results in p-values below 1% when approximating (7) and (8) by 356 
(12) and (13), respectively. 357 
Now, with the supports a and b  distributions closely approximated, the next step is to 358 
compare the actual bid values iB  with the probability curves of the supports and obtain the 359 
probabilities of falling outside the range [ a ,b ]. In order to check this last condition, two 360 
probability-related values are defined: lowabnP , which is the lower bound of the probability 361 
that a iB  value is less than the lower support a ; and highabnP , which is the lower bound of the 362 
probability that a iB  value is more than the upper support b . By means of the cumulative 363 
distribution functions (12) and (13), these probabilities are easily calculated for every iB  as: 364 
 BABBetaP ilowabn   ,,1     (18) 365 
 ABBBetaP ihighabn   ,,     (19) 366 
However, these probabilities are only lower bounds, i.e., they will always underestimate the 367 
probability, since the true values of the supports are only approximated. However, they serve 368 
their purpose since high values of these coefficients always helps shed light on those bids 369 
worth checking in more detail among the number of N2  possible combinations of bid 370 
groups. 371 
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Therefore, the closer are these probabilities to unity, the higher is the probability that, if that 372 
bid was removed from the original set of bid values, conditions 1-4 will be fulfilled. On the 373 
other hand, when the probability is closer to zero, the more unlikely a bid will be capable of 374 
complying with the four conditions and, therefore, the less likely it will qualify as abnormally 375 
low or high. 376 
Nevertheless, to provide an unequivocal interpretation, these two probabilities can be merged 377 
into one that represent in a single figure the lower bound of the probability that every bid falls 378 
outside the range [ a , b ]. This probability is 379 
highabnlowabnabn PPP       (20) 380 
whose interpretation is analogous to the ones given for probabilities lowabnP  and highabnP . 381 
It is worth pointing out however that lower abnP  values do not necessarily indicate that a bid 382 
would be abnormal if it is located well within the bid distribution instead of near the 383 
extremes, this being a task for the Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model presented above. 384 
Table 1 shows the calculations involved for auction #33 taken from the construction bid 385 
dataset introduced in the next section. Additionally, it is also noted that the original bid 386 
values iB  also have to be re-scaled between [ a , b ] using a per-unit scale (as the third row in 387 
the top left of the Table 1 shows) to allow their comparisons with (12) and (13) (as performed 388 
in the simulation curves), which are used afterwards in (18)-(20) and which also range from 0 389 
to 1. 390 
<Table 1> 391 
The highest values of the lower bound of probabilities abnP  for this auction shows that the 392 
lowest bid ( 1i ), as well as the three higher ones ( 6,5,4i ), are those worth checking for 393 
compliance with the four conditions. However, as will be seen later in Table 2, in this 394 
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auction, only bids 4, 5 and 6 satisfy the four conditions when they are individually removed, 395 
so they are the ones that become classified as abnormal (abnormally high in this case). 396 
The major feature of this third contribution, therefore, is that metric abnP  is extremely simple 397 
and quick to calculate and is capable of detecting abnormal bids located nearer the extremes 398 
of the distribution. This feature, together with the ability to detect abnormal bids located near 399 
the bid distribution average by the extended Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model 400 
constitutes a valuable improvement. Nonetheless, broadly speaking, any collusive bidder that 401 
aspires to effectively leverage the bid distribution will be need to be ‘abnormally high or 402 
abnormally low’ to exert sufficient influence, particularly when cartel bids do not comprise 403 
the larger part of the bids – a situation that increases the probability of being detected. 404 
Validation  405 
Method 406 
As described, this paper presents three different but complementary contributions, but they 407 
have to be analyzed mostly as a group. The first is the extension of the original Ballesteros‒408 
González‒Cañavate capped auction model to uncapped auctions. Two of the original four 409 
conditions have been refined to increase its accuracy whereas the variables of the four 410 
conditions have been transformed for use with bids values, unlike the dimensionless bids in 411 
the original model. The way this extended model will be tested requires applying the 412 
reformulated four conditions to an uncapped auction dataset with some known cover bids of 413 
one bidder and observe the ratio of their correct and incorrect detections as abnormal bids. 414 
The second contribution is to propose a new estimator of the bid distribution supports. This 415 
involves using Equation 9 to estimate the bid standard deviation. If this provides a reasonably 416 
good approximation of the true bid standard deviations, then the true supports a  and b  will 417 
also be well approximated since Equation 9 is linearly proportional to the difference ab , 418 
and therefore the coefficient of determination will be close to unity. 419 
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Finally, the third contribution constitutes a new metric named abnP  to help focus the 420 
Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model on bidders located near the extremes being more 421 
likely to be abnormally high or low (remember that abnP  is almost useless for abnormal bids 422 
not located near minB  or maxB ). In this case, metric abnP  will also be tested against the bid 423 
dataset but only in combination with the refined Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model. 424 
Auction dataset 425 
To evaluate the practical application of the method, Skitmore and Pemberton’s (1994) set of 426 
uncapped auction bid data is analyzed. These were donated by a construction company 427 
(encoded as Bidder 304) operating in the London area of the UK and covered this company’s 428 
building contract bid activities during a 12 month period in the early 1980s for a total of 86 429 
contracts. The 51 resulting auctions for which a full set of bids were available are given an 430 
auction ID according to the original bid dataset numbering and are presented in Table 2 along 431 
with the number of participating bidders (column ‘N’) and bidder 304’s position. The sixth 432 
column indicates whether Bidder 304’s bids are genuine or cover bids according to the 433 
information provided by the donating company. Finally, it must be highlighted that this is a 434 
series of auctions where the sole awarding criterion was the lowest bid, with no abnormally 435 
low bid criterion applied pre-set in the auction specifications by the auctioner and with no 436 
knowledge of whether other bidders enter cover bids. This dataset therefore constitutes a very 437 
robust test to the method due to 438 
 the existence of an abnormally low bid criterion greatly conditions the way collusive 439 
bidders act, which makes it easier to discriminate between bids that are only abnormal and 440 
those that are both abnormal and also potentially collusive. 441 
 other bids might also be cover bids and therefore generate extra “noise” in the data. 442 
<Table 2> 443 
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Calculations and validating results 444 
Table 2 reflects the application of the method in 50 out of the 51 auctions (auction #16 was 445 
not taken into account because, as the original Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model, the 446 
minimum number of bidders to be analyzed must be above 3). The second block in Table 3 447 
(columns 4th to 7th) contains the method’s predictions concerning whether bidder 304’s bid 448 
was genuine or cover. In short, conditions 1-4 were checked when bidder 304 (alone or in 449 
combination with other bidders) was removed. The resulting percentage of correct/incorrect 450 
predictions is noticeably high (86% vs 14%), especially taking into account the absence of 451 
information concerning any other cover bidders involved. Furthermore, the model also 452 
detected two out of three abnormal bids not located near the extremes (auctions #9, 15 and 453 
40), a fact worth highlighting since detection is very difficult in this situation. 454 
It is noted that bidder 304’s abnormal bids, being cover bids, are always high, which leaves 455 
the ability of the method to detect abnormally low bids untested. However, as deduced from 456 
the model’s four conditions, the approach to detecting abnormally low bids is equivalent to 457 
that of abnormally high bids, suggesting that, as abnormally high bids have been successfully 458 
detected, abnormally low bids should be equivalently so, since they are symmetrical cases. 459 
Secondly, the third block in Table 3 shows the standard deviation values of the observed bids 460 
(column 8th ‘σ actual’) as well as the estimated values obtained by applying equation 9 461 
(column 9th ‘σ (Eq. 9)’). It must be noted that Equation 9 was expressed as a function of N  462 
(in second column) as well as maxB  and minB  (not presented due to the lack of space). The 463 
coefficient of determination ( 2R ) is 0.988, very close to 1, leading to the conclusion that 464 
Equation 9, as well as the support estimators proposed in Equation 7 and 8 constitute a very 465 
good approximation of the bid distribution boundaries. 466 
Finally, last block on the right of Table 3 (last ten columns) presents the abnP  values for all 467 
bids in which the positions occupied by bidder 304 have been underlined. The sequence of 468 
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calculations followed to obtain these values was identical to the one described in Table 1 for 469 
auction #33. That is, iB , N , maxB  and minB  were used to obtain supports a  and b  from 470 
Equations 7 and 8. The original iB  values were then re-scaled within the interval  ba ,  and 471 
with these re-scaled values (from 0 to 1)  ,  , A  and B  were easily obtained from 472 
Equations 16, 17, 14 and 15. Finally lowabnP  and highabnP  were calculated by Equations 18 and 473 
19, and the final abnP  values obtained by Equation 20. 474 
If we set a tentative threshold at 25.0abnP  , a quick count from Table 3’s last 10 columns 475 
reveals that whenever bidder 304’s bids were genuine, metric abnP  was above 0.25 19 times 476 
(right predictions, 56%) out of 34 (15 wrong predictions, that is 44%). However, when bidder 477 
304’s bids were actually cover bids, the results were slightly better, with 25.0abnP in 10 478 
auctions (62.5% right predictions) out of 16 auctions (37.5% wrong predictions). Obviously, 479 
this is a first approach by setting a abnP  value at 0.25, but seems clear that this metric has at 480 
least a moderate-weak correlation with the predictions generated by the extended 481 
Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model at the cost of very simple and quick calculations. 482 
In short, unlike the previous two research components developed above, metric abnP  is not a 483 
stand-alone abnormal bid detection component, but a complementary coefficient whose main 484 
goal is to rank suspect bids for applying other abnormal bid detection methods such as the 485 
Ballesteros‒González‒Cañavate model. This is especially the case when the number of 486 
possible combinations of bidders is very high, complicating the application of the model 487 
above to all possible scenarios, i.e. subgroups of bidders’ bids. However, there is still way to 488 
go concerning the accuracy of this metric. 489 
Another conclusion concerning these results is that the Standard Bids are well represented by 490 
their respective regression straight lines once the abnormal bidders have been removed (if 491 
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there are any) since their regression lines are always within the limit lines representing a good 492 
fit with the uniform distribution (otherwise not all the four conditions would have been 493 
satisfied). However, the validation carried out here represents only a tentative outcome since 494 
more bid datasets such as the one used would be necessary to ensure the wider application of 495 
the method proposed, bid datasets that are unfortunately very difficult to obtain in practice. 496 
Discussion 497 
The complete extended Ballesteros‒González-Cañavate model has been found to be 498 
potentially able to detect all abnormal bids in addition to solely abnormally expensive or 499 
cheap bids as in the original model. Furthermore, the empirical test in the paper shows the 500 
model to be remarkably accurate at detecting abnormal bids in the form of cover bids in a set 501 
of real bid data, even in the most difficult situation where competition is purely on bid value. 502 
This demonstrates that the extended model developed here is robust to the uniform 503 
distribution assumption for uncapped and capped auctions. In addition, using the German 504 
Tank solution quite surprisingly results in the estimated uniform distribution supports being 505 
expressed solely as a function of the number of bidders involved. 506 
The assumption of uniformly distributed bids is also not necessarily restrictive. Where 507 
another distribution is involved, the bid values can be transformed into a Uniform distribution 508 
by using the probability values of the cumulative distribution without loss of generality. 509 
Finally, it should be noted that previous simpler models have been applied to only relatively 510 
simple bid situations where a smart cartel might avoid being detected by using the very same 511 
tests that check exchangeability and conditional independence in reverse by trying different 512 
bid values until they simulate real competition while still fulfilling their hidden intentions. 513 
Therefore, despite cartel bids being generally more highly correlated than truly competitive 514 
bids (Porter and Zona 1993), provided the tests can be used by either the auctioneer or the 515 
cartel itself, competitive bidding might always be compromised. 516 
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Conclusions 517 
This paper extends and substantially refines the Ballesteros‒González-Cañavate model for 518 
detecting both abnormally high and low bids, provides mathematical expressions to 519 
approximate the bid distribution supports involved and proposes a new metric to focus on 520 
potentially collusive bidders in uncapped auctions. This abnormal bid detection model 521 
partially avoids several drawbacks that other models suffer since: it does not need any 522 
information concerning the bidders involved (apart from all the bids entered) nor about the 523 
contract; and the necessary statistical procedure is quite straightforward while the data 524 
generated allow attention to be drawn to deviations in N/1 multiples, which may eventually 525 
indicate a potentially abnormal behavior. However, for bid pricing decisions it is important to 526 
acknowledge the influence of several other factors such as market conditions, current 527 
workloads and the relationship between the bidder and the owner or engineer; that might not 528 
always be well represented by the method developed in this paper, and eventually generate 529 
unexpected deviations or false abnormal bid alerts. 530 
In the case study, the application described was found to perform well enough overall, with 531 
almost every bid identified as abnormal by the method being an actual cover bid. However, 532 
the proposed method has not been extensively tested, since these bid datasets, such as the one 533 
analyzed here, are extremely difficult to obtain so that it is unlikely that further validation 534 
tests will be possible. In practical terms, therefore, although particularly potentially useful for 535 
sifting the great amount of bid data with which contracting authorities have to work, it is 536 
unlikely that the method could be implemented beyond a first and quick check. In the case 537 
where several contract auctions are found to contain repetitive abnormal bid behavior, the 538 
additional use of other more accurate but complex and time-consuming existing methods will 539 
always be needed. 540 
Finally, the discovery of the central role of the number of bidders in the German Tank 541 
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solution, together with the success of its use in uncapped abnormal bid detection, suggests 542 
that it may be reasonable to believe that the bid standard deviation might not be the only 543 
parameter influenced by the number of bidders in the auction. The next logical step, 544 
therefore, is to find which other parameters may also be expressed as a function of the 545 
number of bidders and, of course, try to predict the number of bidders itself for future 546 
construction contract auctions. 547 
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Table 1: Example of auction #33 complete preliminary analysis for detecting abnormal bids 670 
 671 
672 
Auction Entry ID = 33 Bidder 304's position (i) = ↓ 6 ↓
(Cover)
Bidder (ranked) i 1 2 3 4 5 6 N Bmin Bmax a (eq. 7) b (eq. 8)
Bids (monetary) Bi 792,966 811,788 819,971 847,621 847,892 853,793 6 792,966 853,793 780,801 865,958
Bi (re-scaled) (Bi-a)/(b-a) 0.1429 0.3639 0.4600 0.7847 0.7878 0.8571
 a's  and b's  Beta distribution parameter calculations
Pabn low (eq. 18) 0.4899 0.0781 0.0268 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 μ (eq. 16) υ (eq. 17) A (eq. 14) B (eq. 15)
Pabn high (eq. 19) 0.0000 0.0019 0.0092 0.2915 0.2987 0.4899 0.1667 0.0149 1.3889 6.9444
Pabn (eq. 20) 0.4899 0.0800 0.0361 0.2916 0.2988 0.4899
 33 
Table 2: Uncapped dataset used for the analysis and prediction results 673 
 674 
Auction 304's Results: R² = 0.988 Pab n  values (figures in bold when Pabn ≥ 0.25)
ID N position Inspection of the  4 conditions Prediction Actual Result σ (actual) σ (Eq. 9) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 6 5 Remove Bidder 6 Genuine Genuine Right 24,156 27,077 0.49 0.30 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.49
2 4 4 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 14,951 16,149 0.56 0.17 0.33 0.56
3 7 6 Remove bidder 7 Genuine Genuine Right 213,677 230,422 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.47
4 6 3 Remove Bidders 3+4 or 3+5 or 3+6 Cover Cover Right 28,791 25,561 0.49 0.21 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.49
5 6 6 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 14,118 13,378 0.49 0.45 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.49
6 9 4 Remove bidder 9 Genuine Genuine Right 51,544 64,674 0.45 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.45
7 7 1 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 95,999 104,020 0.47 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.47
8 4 2 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 419,630 493,277 0.56 0.17 0.16 0.56
9 6 3 Remove Bidder 2 or 3 or 4 or 6 Cover Cover Right 44,384 50,503 0.49 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.49
10 4 1 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 39,503 43,631 0.56 0.33 0.17 0.56
11 6 6 Remove Bidders 2 or 3 Genuine Genuine Right 76,901 76,027 0.49 0.25 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.49
12 6 1 Remove Bidders 2 or 3 Genuine Genuine Right 106,582 110,193 0.49 0.34 0.21 0.05 0.08 0.49
13 4 4 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 33,978 34,884 0.56 0.46 0.17 0.56
14 6 5 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Cover Wrong 45,120 43,098 0.49 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.49
15 6 3 Remove Bidders 2+3 or 3+4 or 3+5 Cover Cover Right 97,034 116,595 0.49 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.49
16 3 2 N is too low to analyze - Cover - 21,150 23,843 0.64 0.43 0.64
17 10 10 Remove Bidders 2 or 3 or 10 Cover Cover Right 20,643 22,589 0.44 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.44
18 6 5 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Cover Wrong 18,441 18,751 0.49 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.49
19 9 4 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 177,243 171,618 0.45 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.39 0.45
20 8 2 Bidders to be removed are above N/2 Genuine Genuine Right 287,432 306,506 0.46 0.44 0.36 0.24 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.46
21 7 2 Bidders to be removed are above N/2 Genuine Genuine Right 321,413 382,299 0.47 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.47
22 6 6 Remove Bidder 1 or 4 or 5 Genuine Genuine Right 17,467 19,293 0.49 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.25 0.49
23 5 4 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 35,096 38,563 0.52 0.29 0.09 0.08 0.52
24 8 4 Remove Bidder 1 or 2 or 3 Genuine Genuine Right 43,277 39,389 0.46 0.37 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.30 0.46
25 6 5 Remove Bidders 2 or 5+6 Cover Cover Right 79,358 84,535 0.49 0.31 0.19 0.13 0.04 0.49
26 7 7 Remove Bidder 2 or 3 Genuine Genuine Right 27,035 27,386 0.47 0.25 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.47
27 4 4 Remove Bidders 2 or 3 Genuine Genuine Right 165,506 168,422 0.56 0.53 0.16 0.56
28 7 2 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 75,423 86,869 0.47 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.47
29 6 5 Remove Bidders 1+2 or 3+4 or 5+6 Cover Cover Right 44,337 48,165 0.49 0.03 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.49
30 6 1 Remove Bidder 4 or 5 or 6 Genuine Genuine Right 90,354 94,814 0.49 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.38 0.49
31 6 5 Remove Bidder 1 or 2 or 3 Genuine Cover Wrong 64,663 58,562 0.49 0.38 0.20 0.06 0.33 0.49
32 6 4 Remove Bidder 1 or 2 Genuine Genuine Right 31,029 28,234 0.49 0.45 0.27 0.09 0.26 0.49
33 6 6 Remove Bidders 4 or 5 or 6 Cover Cover Right 24,473 24,583 0.49 0.08 0.04 0.29 0.30 0.49
34 7 7 Remove any Bidder/s but 6 Genuine Cover Wrong 79,823 92,664 0.47 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.47
35 6 4 Remove Bidders 4+6 Genuine Genuine Right 39,184 46,132 0.49 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.49
36 6 4 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 35,498 37,051 0.49 0.40 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.49
37 9 8 Remove bidders 7+9 Genuine Genuine Right 292,439 367,558 0.45 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.45
38 5 5 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 35,418 35,988 0.52 0.32 0.08 0.20 0.52
39 7 7 Remove Bidder 1 or 2 or 3 Genuine Cover Wrong 193,372 178,076 0.47 0.33 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.42 0.47
40 8 4 Remove Bidders 1 or 2 or 3 or 8 Genuine Cover Wrong 106,729 115,820 0.46 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.46
41 6 3 Remove Bidder 2 or 4 or 6 Genuine Genuine Right 69,814 81,337 0.49 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.49
42 8 3 Remove Bidder 8 Genuine Genuine Right 156,785 184,833 0.46 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.46
43 6 5 Remove Bidder 1 or 4 or 5 Cover Cover Right 48,324 56,186 0.49 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.49
44 5 1 Remove Bidder 2 or 3 or 4+5 Genuine Genuine Right 54,408 57,011 0.52 0.37 0.26 0.07 0.52
45 4 4 Remove Bidder 3 or 4 Cover Cover Right 42,668 44,297 0.56 0.24 0.50 0.56
46 7 5 Remover Bidder 2 or 6+7 Genuine Genuine Right 81,045 76,812 0.47 0.25 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.43 0.47
47 8 4 Remove Bidders 1+2+3 or 6+7+8 Genuine Genuine Right 97,091 99,232 0.46 0.42 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.46
48 7 5 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 50,748 55,627 0.47 0.29 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.47
49 5 5 Remove Bidder 1+2+3 or 4 Genuine Cover Wrong 7,161 7,015 0.52 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.52
50 5 3 Remove Bidder 1 or 2 or 4+5 Genuine Genuine Right 41,483 42,189 0.52 0.45 0.14 0.10 0.52
51 6 6 No abnormal bids detected Genuine Genuine Right 57,239 67,333 0.49 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.49
43(86%) right, 7(14%) wrong
